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The article explores the ‘democratic turn’ in political theory and the nascent ideological status 
of the concept of democracy in academic inquiry. The object of its scrutiny are those 
mechanisms intrinsic to theorising through which democratic theory might undertake an 
ideological function. As a test case, the inquiry examines the effect of the democratic turn 
Jürgen Habermas has undertaken in critical social theory of Frankfurt School origin.  The 
original commitment of Critical Theory to emancipation from injustices afflicting capitalist 
democracies was pursued through a critique of ideology as part of the larger critique of the 
dynamics of capitalism. The critical enterprise was marked by suspicions, inherited from Marx, 
of the complicity of liberal democracy in capitalism's delictum. This allowed the pursuit of 
radical social change beyond the conditions for democratic citizenship. Tracing the deepening 
of the democratic turn in Habermas’s analyses of modern society, I note a transition from a 
critique of ideology to ideology-construction – a move in which the institutions of democratic 
citizenship become reified and overburdened with a task they are not equipped to perform – 
that of radical social transformation. Performed in this way, the democratic turn dampens 













Introduction: The ascendance of democracy in political theoryi 
Democracy, or ‘the growing role of the common man in the affairs of state’, in Eric 
Hobsbawm’s phrasing (2000 [1975], 122), became an unstoppable historical force in the second 
half of the 19th century. For quite some time until then, the concept had carried the derogatory 
connotation of mob rule, a regime of the ignorant masses; it had been absent not only from the 
vocabulary of polite politics and educated scholarship, but also from the language of the 
American and the French revolutions of the 18th century.ii When Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison formed the Democratic-Republican Party in 1792, this was an early sign of the term’s 
rapidly changing historical connotation. By 1870, the democratisation of politics in Western 
societies had become irreversible – ‘the exclusion of the masses from politics seemed a utopian 
undertaking,’ even as the prospect of mass democracy was still unpalatable to ruling elites 
(Hobsbawm 2000 [1975], 123, 1987, 85).1   
 
It took, however, another century for the idea of democracy to reign supreme in political theory. 
In 1951, David Easton lamented the declining rigour of political theory, the exhaustion of its 
creative energies and its penchant for turning to the past for inspiration: ‘Contemporary political 
thought lives parasitically on ideas a century old and, what is more discouraging, we see little 
prospect of the development of new political syntheses’. Easton empanelled two reasons for 
the impoverishment of theory. First, political theorists had abandoned theory’s unique function 
– ‘creatively constructing a valuational frame of reference’; that is, offering ideas about the 
desirable course of human affairs. Second, energy had been diverted away from building a 
systematic theory about political behaviour and the operation of political institutions. To 
vigorously connect these two orders of knowledge – fact and value – is the high task of political 
theory, he urged (Easton 1951, 36).   
 
This task was eventually accomplished by the democratic turn in political theory – the 
emergence of a body of scholarship in the second half of the twentieth century that delineated 
a subfield known as ‘democratic theory’. This development was aided by three waves of 
historical upheaval:  decolonization in the 1960s, the 1970s’ democratization in Southern 
Europe, Latin America and Asia, and the collapse of the (quasi) communist dictatorships in 
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Eastern and Central Europe with the end of the Cold War. As democracy became the dominant 
regime across the word and democracy-promotion an avowed foreign policy ambition, so did 
democratic theory ascend to its hegemonic position in political theory. Democratic theory 
confidently rose to Easton’s challenge by making democracy both an empirical object of 
analysis (addressing institutional structures and political behaviour) and a matrix of valuation 
(a normative frame of reference). However, in what follows, I will claim that, under certain 
conditions, democratic theory is apt to mutate into ideology, placing its analytical functions in 
the service of political ones. When it switches to an ideological mode of operation, democratic 
theory places its analytical rigour, albeit inadvertaintly, at the service of conservative political 
goals – namely, of normalizing and therefore stabilising relations of oppression.  
 
I am setting aside the amply-discussed deliberate misuse of the discourse of democracy in the 
pursuit of an imperialistic agenda – the deliberate politicisation of democratic theory. Any set 
of values can be hijacked for nefarious political purposes, just like the totalitarian regimes in 
Eastern Europe and China did with the ideals of communism, or neoliberal capitalism did with 
the hedonistic irreverence of 1968. Neither do I hold that theory should be objective in the sense 
of being value-free and therefore politically neutral. Any framework of conceptualisation 
selectively articulates what is relevant and how it is meaningful, and is therefore part of 
struggles over the structuring of the social order. To remain critical of power dynamics, 
democratic theory needs to, at a minimum, be cognizant  of, and come to terms with, the 
particular ideological nature of its own theorising. 
 
I herefore undertake to explore the mechanisms intrinsic to theorising through which 
democratic theory is prone to reproduce the very ideological effects it purports to critique. In 
other words, I propose to investigate the ideological kernel contained in a certain type of 
scientific analysis of modern western societies that proceeds as a scrutiny of the institutional 
configurations and normative arsenal of liberal democracy.  
 
In what follows, I will argue that democratic theory starts performing an unintended ideological 
function when the mechanisms of theorizing contain an incestuously close co-existence 
between democracy as an object of analysis, a normative horizon of critique, a social ontology 
(a set of presuppositions about society from which the inquiry proceeds) and a tool of 
progressive social change. When such circularity emerges, democratic theory, I will claim, 
becomes a source of normative validation for its purported object of critique. Theory transforms 
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from an explanatory device with a critical, world-disclosing purpose into a doctrine – a 
conceptual mechanism of justification and stabilisation of power relations.  
 
When speaking of the ideological effects of the democratic turn in political theory I do not have 
in mind ideology as an explicit political doctrine, a dogma – akin to the way Marxism was 
deployed by the dictatorships in East and Central Europe and is still used in China. Neither do 
I refer to ideology as ‘false consciousness’ that is to be dissolved when confronted by the 
scientific method (this connotation implies that there is a cognitively pure, socially untainted 
mental state).iii Rather, I refer to ideology as a system of beliefs and attitudes (collective 
rationalisations) accepted unreflectively by the agents who hold them. As these ideas are thus 
endowed with the status of commonsense, they delineate a normative horizon beyond which 
critique and criticism cannot reach. In this way, they mask, or divert attention away from, the 
manner in which these ideas originate in relations of power, validate these relations, and supply 
legitimacy to forms of socialisation that perpetuate these power relations.  
 
Importantly, ideology is not simply a matter of normativity, of valorisation of rules and 
practices. It is also a vehicle for establishing and maintaining the social conditions needed for 
the unproblematic reproduction of the system of social relations that yields the particular 
ideological constructs.  A political theory or philosophy could play an ideological role in 
society, notes Raymond Geuss, ‘in that it fostered certain common ideological illusions, made 
them more difficult to detect, or created new ones, e.g. the idea […] that all people in every 
society everywhere aspire before all else to a particular kind of “democratic” political culture’ 
(2008, 53). The shift from theory to dogma is not rooted in the empirical observation that some 
societies at a certain historical conjuncture might be endorsing democracy. The ideological 
transgression, rather, germinates from the conjecture (the idea) that this is the case – a 
presupposition built into the very foundation of theorising. To be sure, vetting political theory 
as a standard bearer of democracy is not necessarily objectionable. Yet political decency and 
academic honesty command that, whenever it enters into a mode of ideology-production, 
democratic theory admits and effectively endorses such a function – and pays the requisite price 
for it.  
 
As a test case of my hypothesis I will take critical social theory of Frankfurt School origin 
(hereafter Critical Theory)iv, and will focus on the democratic turn that Jürgen Habermas has 
effected within this school of thought. Critical Theory is a particularly appropriate object for 
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the study of the relations between theory and ideology within democratic theory for at least 
three reasons,. Firstly, it inherits from Karl Marx the ideal of democracy as a form of 
emancipated society – that is, society emancipated from the imperatives of the competitive 
production of profit and therefore able to focus on long-term societal interest. In this sense, 
Critical Theory constitutes a form of democratic theory. Secondly, it has maintained a 
commitment to eliminating the injustices that afflict capitalist democracies (such as growing 
material inequalities as well as gender and racial discrimination) which  remain central concerns 
of democratic theory today. Thus, Critical Theory’s treatment of forms of discrimination is part 
of its critique of democratic capitalism as a comprehensive social formation – analysis informed 
of Marxian critique of political economy and Freudian psychoanalysis. The first generation of 
Frankfurt School authors has interpreted racialized and gendered social roles as part of an 
oppressive ideology and the construction of exclusive collective identities as a strategy for 
oppression.v  Thirdly, the intellectual enterprise of unmasking injustice is pursued through a 
critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik) – systems of beliefs and attitudes (collective 
rationalizations) accepted unreflectively by the agents who hold them (Geuss 1981, 20).vi In 
this sense, theory is deliberately on the alert for the entrapments of ideology.  
 
Jürgen Habermas’s iteration of Critical Theory warrants particular attention because the author 
is explicitly dedicated to constructing a theory of democratic politics. He contends that the 
continuous proceduralization of the democratic ideal (putting in place procedures for nurturing 
and enacting the democratic will) safeguards us from the temptation of ideology-construction 
-- social criticism thus keeps clear from a substantive normative project susceptible to 
ideological sanctification. Tracing the deepening of the democratic turn in Habermas’s analyses 
of modern society, however, I discern,  an inadvertent transition from a critique of ideology to 
ideology-construction. Underlying this transition is the recasting of critical social theory that 
Habermas undertakes. As conceived by the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers, 
critique was an aporetic inquiry animated by a commitment to emancipation from domination 
without the guidance of transcendental ideals. Habermas, instead, rebuilds critical theory as a 
normative political theory guided by the ideal of democracy as a matrix of justice, a 
(counterfactual) conceptual device for identifying injustices, as well as a practical 
institutionalisation of a just society.  This shift charts a secure path for progressive politics. Yet, 
this security comes at a price – that of narrowing, if not altogether foreclosing, the critical 
enterprise because democracy transforms from an essentially contested concept with a heuristic 
and critical purpose to one designating a final destination, a telos – both conceptually and 
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politically.vii In what follows, I will first review some of the tenets of Critical Theory as 
formulated by its founders, with particular attention paid to democracy and ideology critique. I 
will then trace the democratic turn in the work of Jürgen Habermas in order to disclose the 
particular mechanisms that tend to misdirect democratic theory into the mode of ideology-
construction. 
 
The democratic credentials of Critical Theory  
The first generation of Frankfurt School authors set out to develop a dialectical social theory with 
a practical emancipatory intent; the idea of emancipation, both as a normative yardstick and a 
political goal, is what distinguishes ‘critical theory’ from a positivistic theory that aims at 
description and explanation (Horkheimer 2002 [1937]). This normative commitment to 
emancipation does not set an unquestionable normative horizon (and thus, does not deteriorate 
into ideology) because emancipatory critique is not driven by a distinct telos susceptible to 
sanctification. This is a commitment, to use a phrase coined by Amy Allen, to ‘emancipation 
without Utopia’ (Allen 2015).viii Critical Theory inherits this aversion to grand normative ideals 
from Marx, who rejects romantic visions of communism and offers no detailed account of a 
post-capitalist society beyond the idea that such a society would institutionalise the values of 
social cooperation and mutuality: thus, communism becomes the only possible realization of 
democracy as the spontaneous self-organisation of the people (Critique of the Gotha 
Programme 1875; German Ideology 1845). For Marx, ‘communism is not a state of 
affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call 
communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things’ (Marx 1845).  
 
Emancipation is therefore to be understood as a process, not a final point, a terminus: it is a process 
of identifying and removing the circumstances of oppression (Horkheimer 1982, 244), rather than 
offering a blueprint for the institutional framework and normative substance of an emancipated 
life. Admittedly, in Marx’s analysis of the movement of history from one social order to another, 
communism is also a social formation that is  to supersede capitalism. However, Marx does not 
elaborate the normative substance of communism other than in the most inclusive conception of 
humanism – a condition where ‘the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all’ (Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto 1848). Marx’s ideas of 
Communism’s institutional infrastructure (e.g. public ownership of the means of production) 
do not arise out of an abstract search for the institutionalisation of the values of solidarity and 
mutuality, but through a scrutiny of the harmful dynamics of 19th century capitalism. The 
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private property of the means of production is to be eliminated because of the specific form of 
injustice (e.g. exploitation) that it generates, as well as because it becomes a hindrance to the 
further development of the forces of production and to technological advancement.  In a word, 
while democracy is present as a normative ideal, the analysis proceeds in the form of critical 
scrutiny of the historically specific forms of injustice and the underlying dynamics and 
structures that generate these injustices.ix 
 
While identifying and fighting oppression is a goal of the intellectual enterprise, the critique of 
ideology (Ideologiekritik) was adopted by the early Frankfurt School authors as a key instrument 
of critique. The systems of beliefs and attitudes (collective rationalisations) accepted 
unreflectively by the agents who hold them are at the center of Critical Theory’s scrutiny. 
However, the ultimate ambition of Ideologiekritik is not just to destabilize the oppressive certainty 
of normative attitudes (to deprive them of their status of common-sense), but also to unveil the 
social conditions and power dynamics within which these normative attitudes emerge; critique is 
to provide ‘a comprehensive insight into the objective origin of ideologies and the objectivity of 
their social function’ (Adorno 1972 [1956], 185). Ideologies contain a grain of truth in the sense 
that they originate within intersubjective (ergo, objectively existing) power dynamics, which 
themselves are rooted within social structures.  Proper critique of ideology therefore necessitates 
an analysis of the ‘conditions which make them [individuals] what they are or to which they are 
subject’ within a study of ‘the objective historical constellations’ and the structures that underpin 
them (Adorno 1972 [1956], 184). I will abstain from venturing here a detailed clarification of what 
is meant by the ‘objectivity’ of the structured social environment that critique is to target.x What 
is important for the purposes of the current inquiry is to note that critique is to focus not on 
substantive states of autonomy (ideals of autonomous life) but instead on conditions of 
autonomy (enabling conditions) and processes of gaining autonomy – our social environment 
must be appropriately structured to allow collective self-determination.  
 
Those ‘objective historical constellations’ that are to be the terrain of critique are the various 
iterations of capitalism as a comprehensive social order. Thus, in his analysis of capitalism, 
Adorno often refers to it as the  ‘social whole’ (e.g. Adorno 1937), a ‘social totality’ which is 
fractured yet internally structured (e.g. Adorno 1973, 47).xi From its inception, Critical Theory 
adopts from Marx an understanding of capitalism as a historically specific comprehensive system 
of social relations. It develops as a school of thought through historicist analyses of capitalism as 
a social formation shaped by the dynamics of capital accumulation (the competitive profit 
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production), of the institutional and normative infrastructure through which these dynamics are 
enacted, and of the forms of life they engender.xii  
 
The historicist nature of social analysis is here of paramount importance. As Marx notes, ‘we will 
have to examine the history of men, since almost the whole ideology amounts either to a distorted 
conception of this history or to a complete abstraction from it. Ideology is itself only one of the 
aspects of this history.’ (Marx, German Ideology 1845).xiii  The normative task of emancipation is 
to be achieved by deploying philosophy and social science in interdisciplinary empirical social 
research (Horkheimer 1993). Such an ambitious programme of analysis would require a 
comprehensive social theory which the first generation of Frankfurt School authors achieve 
through building a synthesis between a Marxian critique of the political economy of capitalism 
and  ananalysis of mass psychology informed by Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, the critiques 
of capitalist society developed by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Otto 
Kirchheimer, Walter Benjamin and Herbert Marcuse, took the shape of historicist analyses ranging 
from a critique of consumerism and mass culture, militarism, environmental crisis, and economic 
disruption, to analyses of the authoritarian personality. 
 
What is the status of liberal democracy as an object of critique within Critical Theory, thus 
conceived? To the extent that the institutional edifice and normative matrix of liberal democracy 
are  part of democratic capitalism as a unitary (albeit fractured) social order, they become objects 
of scrutiny for Critical Theory.xiv Because the original commitment to emancipation was pursued 
through a critique of the dynamics of capitalism and its attendant socio-cultural representations, 
critical theorists inherited from Marx suspicions of the complicity of liberal democracy in 
capitalism’s delictum. Importantly, object of critique and target of criticism is the manner in which 
the conception of liberal democracy and its particular institutionalisations underpin dynamics of 
oppression. It is in this sense that for Critical Theory of Frankfurt School origin democracy is an 
essentially contested concept – the process of contestation consists not so much in maintaining the 
conceptual indeterminacy of the notion of democracy as in questioning the work that the notion 
does in view of the emancipatory commitments of critical theory.xv 
 
Marx’s misgivings about liberalism and liberal democracy are well known. They have to do with 
the universalistic normative content of natural law and social contract traditions underpinning 
the institutional model of liberal democracy. Marx insists that the human essence should be 
grasped not as an ‘abstraction inherent in each single individual’, but instead as social essence, 
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whose reality is the ‘ensemble of the social relations’ (Thesis on Feuerbach, 1845: VI). It is 
this ontology of the socially embedded individual, the socially constructed nature of human 
subjectivity, and of social life as a unity of historically specific social practices that prevents 
the abstract values of rationality and mutuality (which  undergird the idea of democracy) from 
being vetted also as instruments and procedures for attaining a democratic form of society.  
Moreover, Marx holds that by forging the idea of legal persons as seemingly free and equal, 
and thus of bearers of equal individual rights, liberal constitutionalism mimics the contract 
relationship governing the bourgeois economy, thereby masking the structures of social 
inequality on which the system is based. Marx’s misgivings about the institutional edifice of 
liberal democracy are shared by the first generation of Frankfurt school authors.  Marcuse 
speaks of the ‘repressive tolerance’ of liberal democracy (Marcuse 1965); he rejects the 
democratic argument for tolerance (of all positions, including those of the misinformed and the 
bigots) because this argument is ‘invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself,’ 
i.e., by the concentration of economic and political power in late capitalism (a theme that 
Habermas takes up later). Indeed, deficiencies in the existing practice of democracy and the 
inability of the institutional paraphernalia of liberal democracy to embed a just society remain of 
core interest for critical theorists to this day, in the work of Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Axel 
Honneth, Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and many others.  
 
To be sure, critical theory inherits from Marx a commitment to democracy as a spontaneous self-
organisation of the people. Importantly, members of the tradition share an understanding of the 
non-alienated form of collective human existence as a rational society, not just a political system; 
the democratic state of society is one in which ‘all conditions of social life that are controllable by 
human beings depend on real consensus’ (Horkheimer 1982, 249f). However, this normative 
commitment does not transform into an ideological endorsement of democracy as a political 
system because the social theory through which the critique is conducted does not have a place for 
a socially unencumbered self and a rational society in its ontology – that is, democracy is not 
among the set of presuppositions from which the social world is viewed. That ontology is instead 
centered on the notion of human beings as social beings whose social essence is shaped by the 
ensemble of  social relations – as I noted in the earlier discussion of Marx. Thus, a distance is 
preserved between a normative commitment to a democratic society and an understanding of the 
socially constituted reality. To obtain ‘real democracy’, procedural mechanisms and institutional 
devices would therefore not do; one would need to change the system of social relations within 
which human beings interact. Critique therefore takes shape as an analysis of the historically 
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specific dynamics, institutional settings and structures of socialisation, with particular attention to 
the power dynamics generating domination – including those that run under the auspices of 
legitimate democratic procedures.  
 
Within such an understanding of the tasks and methods of Critical Theory, the fallacy of the 
democratic turn would not be related to the intrinsic qualities of liberal democracy as a political 
system or the emancipatory normative potential contained in the principles of equality and 
liberty, but rather in the nature of theory deployed in the analysis of society. When critique is 
performed without attention to the historically specific power dynamics and social structures 
that underpin the institutions and enact the norms of liberal democracy, those institutions and 
norms become liable to serve the very interests which emancipatory critique is to unmask.  
Adorno notes that the price of failing to perform a critique of ideology as a comprehensive analysis 
of the historical circumstances and structural conditions of oppression is twofold. On the one hand, 
it enables the perpetuation of the conditions of oppression, on the other hand, it supplies the 
oppression with justification: ‘the domination over the deluded is also justified’ (Adorno 1972 
[1956], 184).  
 
The first generation of Critical Theory scholars deploy these tenets of critique – a normative 
commitment to a democratic society enacted via a critique of capitalism as a historically specific 
system of social relations – through a wide-ranging investigation into the transition from 
nineteenth-century liberal capitalism to the monopolistic and state-managed capitalism 
(Spätkapitalismus) of the twentieth century.xvi 
 
Habermas’s democratic turn  
Habermas’s first publications (on consumer society, the media, work and leisure) retain the 
features of analysis typical of the first generation of Frankfurt School authors – a historicist critique 
of the oppressive dynamics of democratic capitalism as a comprehensive social formation. His 
first major work, his post-doctoral dissertation (‘Habilitationsschrift') The Structural 
Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere (1989 [1962]) provides a historical account of 
the emergence and consolidation in 18th-century Europe (the time of pre-industrial, liberal 
capitalism) of a critical public with its own institutionalised sphere of action. He credits this 
public with a capacity to hold state power accountable through the use of reason in a process 
of argumentation. Here the perspective of critique alters: analysis centres on the democratic 
constitutional state; the main emancipatory concern is the power asymmetry between central 
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political authority and citizenry. Attention is shifted away from the processes of socialisation, 
of the social production of reasoning publics. Tellingly, Adorno and Horkheimer found the 
dissertation insufficiently critical of the ideology of liberal democracy, and rejected it (Calhoun 
1992, 4f).xvii  
 
From the historical account of the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere, with its (purported) 
emancipatory powers, Habermas derives the philosophical construct of the public sphere as a 
realm of social interactions (ideally) impervious to the malign influence of money and power, 
in which citizens relate to one another as fully rational beings. This philosophical construct 
becomes the social ontology from the perspective of which Habermas develops his critique of 
the dynamics of modernity. On this conceptual foundation Habermas then builds his diagnosis 
about the erosion of the democratic public sphere in the conditions of modern mass society in 
late capitalism. It is worth noting that the very entry point of analysis – the bourgeois public 
sphere – presupposes an unproblematic co-existence between the dynamics of capitalism and 
those of democratic citizenship. In this account, under the impact of industrialization and the 
rise of consumerism in late capitalism, the concerns of efficiency that are central to the 
dynamics of economic production and administrative rule start to penetrate the cultural system, 
eventually stifling genuine democratic debate. The active publicity of genuine democracy is 
replaced by the passive consumption of technical media of communication and entertainment. 
As a result, the separation between the private, public, and political realms on which classical 
bourgeois democracy had depended is lost. The public sphere becomes indivisible from the 
sphere of private conflict, which ultimately imperils democracy. In this first comprehensive 
analysis Habermas articulates of modern society, it is the erosion of the structural conditions 
for democracy, understood as the autonomy of the public sphere, that marks advanced 
capitalism. The solution is implied in the diagnosis – a secure institutionalisation of the 
democratic public sphere must be provided so as to safeguard it from the perilous instrumental 
dynamics of modernity. 
 
The democratic turn that Habermas thus undertakes in Critical Theory from the 1960s onwards 
offers an effective solution to Critical Theory’s predicament at the time. By the late 1950s, the 
emancipatory ambitions of Critical Theory had entered an impasse, with Horkheimer and 
Adorno articulating a distinctly grim diagnosis of total alienation in the context of advanced 
capitalism (Azmanova 2019b). It is this aporia – the enduring commitment to emancipatory 
critique, combined with the apparent impossibility of discerning either a plausible vantage point 
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of critique or a political project of emancipation -- that prompts Habermas to proffer the notion 
of a politically emancipated critical public as an agent of emancipation. This, however, would 
demand a thorough recasting of the intellectual apparatus of critique, which Habermas 
endeavours to accomplish in subsequent writing by drawing on Kantian moral theory, 
linguistics, developmental psychology, and systems theory. Ultimately, this would lead him to 
replace the Marxian critique of capitalism as a comprehensive and historically specific social 
formation with a critique of modernity’s drive for economic and administrative rationalization. 
The project of emancipation comes to be centered on institutional tools and procedures for 
democratic citizenship, within an affirmative conception of historical progress (Allen 2016). 
 
Legitimation Crisis (1975 [1973]) delivers an important shift in the social ontology through 
which the critical enterprise proceeds. Habermas intends this work to be an application of 
Marx’s critique of capitalism to the conditions of the late 20th century. However, he alters 
Marx’s conceptualisation of capitalism as a comprehensive system of social relations by 
drawing on Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism and Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. In 
this revised version, society stands as a unity of formalised and relatively autonomous, though 
inter-connected, economic, administrative, socio-cultural and legitimation systems (or 
subsystems) of action, each contributing to social integration and with relative functional 
autonomy from each other. Thus, while like Marx, the first generation of critical theorists 
perceived democratic capitalism as an institutionalised social order permeated by capitalism’s 
constitutive dynamics – the competitive production of profit (with its concomitant dynamics of 
commodification, exploitation and alienation) -- Habermas constraints  the dynamics of 
capitalism to the economy as one subsystem alongside others. This would allow him to present 
the political institutions of democracy and liberal constitutionalism, due to their presumed 
autonomous status, as vehicles of emancipation.  
 
Let us recall that for Marx, as for the first generation of Frankfurt School authors, rationality 
itself had been a problem (i.e. as being prone to alienation and false consciousness engendered 
by capitalist social relations). Habermas purports to solve this problem by way of distinguishing 
between, on the one hand, the instrumental rationality that eventually entraps reason’s 
emancipatory valence and, on the other, the communicative rationality that preserves its 
emancipatory power under certain conditions. These conditions refer to maintaining the 
autonomy of the public sphere (a sphere outside of the institutionalized political system) as a 
space of free opinion- and will-formation (e.g. Habermas 1984/87 [1981]).  
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Importantly, Habermas discerns the conditions of emancipated life not in terms of the socio-
economic dynamics structuring the system of social relations, but in terms of conditions 
regarding morality, democracy and law that are propitious to the free opinion- and will- 
formation of citizens. He holds that the contradictions of advanced capitalism could be brought 
to consciousness and thematised (and thus addressed) under conditions of substantive 
democracy – i.e., genuine participation of citizens in the process of discursive political will-
formation. To prevent this, the administrative system of capitalist democracies shields itself 
from the process of free will-formation via the mechanisms of formal democracy that nurture 
a passive citizenry – in the formula of ‘civic privatism of the civil public’ (political abstinence 
combined with an orientation towards career, leisure and consumption with attendant demands 
from public authority for money, leisure time and security). Ultimately, this entails the demise 
of the public sphere of solidarity and non-instrumental rationality, as this sphere becomes 
colonized by the technical rationality of administration, deployed in the management of the 
economy and culture (Habermas 1984/87 [1981]).  
 
Thus, by the 1980s, the nature of Habermas’ social critique has altered significantly – in his 
analyses the culprit of social injustice becomes not capital but the state 
(‘administration’,‘technocracy’), and therefore solutions emerge within the remit of democracy 
as a political system rather than in the remit of the political economy (e.g. new forms of 
property; countering the dynamics of capital accumulation). This is predicated on Habermas’s 
no longer stylizing capitalism as a comprehensive social order, but rather as a domain of value-
neutral instrumental rationality (deployed in the production of wealth) which can be oriented 
towards human values through democracy.   
 
In terms of political emancipation, revolutionary mobilisations are replaced by the procedural 
mechanisms of deliberative democracy which help establishthe principles of legitimate law-
making in which the ‘revolutionary subject’ is the rational and reasonable citizenry; collective 
and individual emancipation is achieved via the consensus of all citizens of a legally constituted 
community in a dynamic and conflictual process of reason-giving and reason-taking. The key 
claim is that political deliberation develops a truth‐tracking potential, thereby facilitating a 
legitimation process under certain conditions – namely, that a self‐regulating media system 
gains independence from its social environments and that anonymous audiences enable a 
feedback between an informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society (Habermas 2006).  
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Rather than seeking the emancipatory dimension of socially embodied human rationality (the 
possibility of undoing alienation and false consciousness) in the structural conflicts endemic to 
capitalism, Habermas locates these conditions in the structures of linguistic interactions 
(Habermas 1979 [1976], 1990 [1983], 1984/87 [1981], 1998a).  The matrix of emancipated 
social existence is unencumbered communication. Here Habermas tackles the Marxian problem 
of false consciousness (that is, the proletariat’s incapacity to perceive its proper interests as an 
exploited class and endorsing, instead, the interest of the bourgeoisie) by replacing the 
productivist paradigm of society based on labour with a discursive paradigm of society based 
on communication. In turn, this solution is enabled by the distinction between communicative 
and strategic forms of rationality and action.  
 
The substitution of the critique of capitalism as a social formation with the philosophy of 
language has significant consequences for the critical enterprise. Presenting the preconditions 
for non-alienated communicative rationality (free from the instrumental logics of power and 
money) in terms of an ideal speech situation of unencumbered communication transforms the 
immanent critique of capitalist democracies into a constructivist search for the procedural 
conditions for a democratic public sphere that can nurture citizens’ capacity for collective self-
determination. The historicity of this sphere rests solely on intersubjective communicative 
procedures which face practical limits in scope and scale.  
 
In his monumental work Between Facts and Norms (1998b [1992]) Habermas reinforces his 
reliance on the properly institutionalised public sphere as he seeks to realize social freedom 
through law, thus viewing democracy not as a form of society, but as a form of political system 
perfectly compatible with a capitalist system of social relations. Let us recall that one of the 
tenets of Marx’s critical approach is the effort to denaturalise and demystify the bourgeois 
division between, on the one hand, the private sphere of socio-economic existence structured 
by private rights and, on the other, the sphere of public freedoms, duties and virtues claiming 
to nurture democratic citizenship.  Habermas replaces the Marxian critique of the process 
through which notions of democratic citizenship render legitimacy to exploitative dynamics in 
the private sphere with an effort to construct a philosophical formula through which the tension 
between the sphere of social existence and that of political membership is conceptually 
resolved. The solution comes in the formula of the co-originality between private and public 
autonomy within a properly articulated and institutionalised system of rights. With this, 
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Habermas deepens the liberal-democratic turn in critical theory: the critical enterprise proceeds 
as a critique of democracy and its cultural and institutional prerequisites (a public sphere of 
free deliberation) rather than as a critique of the socio-political order (democratic capitalism). 
 
Thus, while for Marx and the early Frankfurt School authors the combination between liberal 
constitutionalism and democratic citizenship had been part of the problem insofar as it serves 
capitalist reproduction, for Habermas liberal democracy is part of the solution, as he deems the 
procedures and institutions of liberal democracy as  able to safeguard social solidarity from the 
systemic logic of economic and administrative efficiency.  While Critical Theory had suspected 
liberal democracy as being the political institutionalisation of bourgeois rule, Habermas 
champions liberal democracy as being the ‘performative meaning of the practice of self-
determination’ (1998b [1992] 110). In his account, liberal democracy, properly 
institutionalised, can supply the conditions for autonomous political will-formation since it 
embodies a system of rights that ensures all citizens’ access to equal political participation.  We 
are asked to have faith that, notwithstanding our socialisation within a system of social relations 
permeated by capitalism’s constitutive dynamics of primitive accumulation and competitive 
profit-production, we can rely on the institutions of liberal democracy (including an 
autonomous public sphere) to set us free from that socialisation. At best, this strategy can 
contribute to the democratization of the political organization of capitalism – making capitalism 
more inclusive. However, we have no solid reasons to believe that the democratization of 
capitalism will amount to a radical social transformation – that is, a transformation of the very 
system of social relations.  
 
The recasting of the critical enterprise through what I described as ‘democratic turn’ effected 
by Habermas has strong advantages. In elaborating his model of deliberative liberal democracy, 
Habermas retains the commitment to emancipation that has been constitutive for Critical 
Theory. The values of autonomy and solidarity which had served as normative pillars in the 
Marxian critique of capitalism undergird Habermas’ trust in the emancipatory potential of non-
instrumental, communicative interactions in a genuinely democratic public sphere and a 
lifeworld untainted by the instrumental rationality of power and money. Moreover, Habermas 
does not stipulate a substantive ideal of democracy that could become an object of ideology-
construction. No norms of justice are offered a priori; democratic publics are not only to 
validate binding norms, but to generate these through actual processes of reasoned 
argumentation. This perspective ‘privileges the communicative presuppositions and procedural 
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conditions of democratic opinion- and will- formation as the sole source of legitimation’ (1996, 
450, 1995). The quality of democracy stands as a matter of the quality of the process of reasoned 
deliberation. Henceforth, the task of democratic theory is to articulate the mechanisms and 
conditions for such a deliberation (Azmanova 2012, 32-39, 100).  
 
However, as Habermas subordinates, and thus trivializes, the critique of capitalism within the 
larger framework of a critique of the democratic public sphere – whose emancipatory power is 
conceptualised with the tools of philosophy of language and linguistics – he removes social 
analysis from political theory. Capitalism is reduced to a market economy and the critique of 
political economy all but vacates analysis. This deprives critical social theory of the conceptual 
tools it needs to scrutinise the socio-structural dynamics of domination that embed and 
condition the very creation of the social subject. The project of emancipation as  
democratisation of the entire social order, as conceived by the founders of Critical Theory, is 
reduced to a project of the proper institutionalisation of the public sphere. With this, the status 
of democracy changes: it becomes a political project, not a form of society.  
 
Through the democratic turn in Critical Theory, thus performed, the enterprise of 
Ideologiekritik transforms from a scrutiny of the historically particular social conditions of 
injustice and the forms of consciousness these conditions engender into liberal-democratic 
ideology-construction.  Autonomy, social cooperation and mutuality are no longer just ethical 
values (a valuational frame of reference) -- they are also elements of the social ontology (a 
description of the human condition) from which the critique draws its fundamental 
presuppositions. In other words, autonomy, social cooperation and mutuality are deemed to be 
features of unencumbered anthropological communicative reason which is in turn an enabling 
condition for democratic reasoned argumentation – a precondition for democracy. Theory thus 
already presupposes what it tries to demonstrate analytically and achieve politically. When 
democracy (and its attendant rational and sociable subjects) becomes both a normative ideal 
and a component of the ontology, the ensuing circularity forecloses the critical enterprise. 
Democracy as an ideal and an enabling condition for attaining this ideal becomes immune to 
critical scrutiny -- democracy becomes an idol. This risks making the enterprise of the critique 
of ideology complicit in moral and ideological justifications for that social order whose 
injustices and contradictions are meant to form the object of critique. In other words, the 
democratic turn in Critical Theory has not only deserted the critique of capitalism as an 
organizing pillar of social criticism.  It has also brought the other of its pillars (Ideologiekritik) 
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to a state of limbo as it has embarked on constructing ideological representations of liberal 
democracy instead of deconstructing the ideological justifications that liberal democracy as a 
political system supplies to capitalism as a social system. Enters Ideologiekritik-cum-ideology-
construction.xviii  This move eliminates the space of reflexivity within which the on-going 
contestation of democracy’s contribution to emancipation can take place. Once democracy is 
equated with the emancipatory project itself, the concept can no longer perform the aporetic 
work of disclosure.  
 
Conclusion: towards a critical democratic theory  
What lessons should a political theory that is committed to progressive ends, as democratic 
theory surely is, draw from the democratic turn in Critical Theory, as effected by Jürgen 
Habermas? Exactly 400 years ago, Francis Bacon formulated the mission of political theory as 
charting the road ‘between the arrogance of dogmatism, and the despair of skepticism’ (Bacon, 
2000 [1620], Introduction). In the context of the early twenty-first century – a time beset by the 
rise of autocrats professing to salvage democracy -- the challenge is to keep our faith in 
democracy without elevating it to an idol. To stay the course between dogmatism and 
scepticism, democratic theory needs to preserve the contestability of its core concept – that of 
democracy -- and deploy it in the aporetic project of critique. This contestability, I have 
suggested, is not just a matter of maintaining the definitional openness, or indeterminacy, of 
the notion of democracy. Rather, it consists in on-going scrutiny of the work this notion does 
in view of the goals of emancipation.  
 
In order to leave the space of reflexive contestation open, a distance needs to be maintained 
between the normative goals of theory, the social ontology from which theorising proceeds, 
and the requisite tools of analysis.  When these are equated, the ensuing circularity vitiates the 
rigor of the analysis: in this mode, a theory can do little more than supply normative validation 
of its object of analysis, thereby becoming a vehicle of ideology construction.  When the idea 
of an emancipated/just society is equated with democratic politics, when democratic politics is 
posited as a tool of emancipation, and in turn that conceptual edifice is placed  on the foundation 
of an ontology that views human beings as naturally prone to reasonable and rational 
coordination of their collective existence, democratic theory acquires tremendous authority. 
Enhancing in this way its own credentials, democratic theory is prone to operate in the manner 
of a political theology committed to the fostering of democracy as a civil religion. If this is the 
aspiration of democratic political theory – then we know what road to take.  
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Indeed, democracy has become one of those rhetorical ‘common-places of common sense’, to 
borrow Michel Billig’s phrase, a unit of broadly shared knowledge without fixed content, which 
lulls our thinking as it anchors it. In its mode of Democratic Theory, political theory reinforces 
our seemingly benevolent ‘democratic prejudice’, thus making us not only poor readers of the 
past but also poor critics of the present and blinding us to the opportunities of the future.xix This 
poses a problem especially for any political and social theory that defines itself as a critical 
enterprise and aspires to offer a valiant critique of capitalism as a system of social relations. 
Such a critical effort cannot only seek to disclose the ways in which capitalism imperils 
democracy, but must also clarify the ways in which liberal democracy as a political system 
hampers or enables capitalism as a social system. To the extent that democratic politics 
concerns institutionally mediated expressions of broadly shared preferences, democracy as a 
political system functions on the terrain of socially produced subjectivities. This is not a matter 
of ‘false consciousness’, ill will or deficient rationality. As Wolfgang Streeck observes, 
‘expectations in relation to which the political-economic system must legitimate itself exist not 
only among the population, but also on the side of capital-as-actor’ (Streeck 2017, 21). The 
dynamics of capital reproduction affect, even if they do not constitute, the democratic subjects. 
It is in this way that liberal democracy becomes not only hostage to the exploitative dynamic 
of capitalism but also complicit in these dynamics. Even in conditions of fully democratised 
capitalism, when the structures of private property of the means of production and the attendant 
asymmetries of power are eliminated, democratic citizens can remain fully committed to the 
process of capital reproduction with all its deleterious effects on human beings, their societies 
and their natural environment. That we are all equally complicit in, and equally damaged by, 
these dynamics is not much of a consolation. This means that political theory should remain 
committed to the normative ideals of democracy without burdening democratic politics of 
inclusion and equality with the task of radical social transformation. If it is to discern the path 
for such a transformation towards a more just society, critical political theory should aim to 
develop as a sociologically informed critique of the historically specific social order we inhabit. 
For truly democratic politics demands a truly democratic society. 
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i I am grateful to Azar Dakwar, Raphaël Wolff and Daniel López Pérez for their insightful and timely feedback to 
earlier drafts. 
ii As Pierre Rosanvallon reminds us, the term democracy did not belong to the vocabulary of Enlightenment 
philosophers and it was not until 1848 that the word democracy definitively entered political discourse in France. 
Between 1789 and 1796, none of the numerous revolutionary newspapers and journals used ‘democracy’ or 
‘democratic’ in their name. In the U.S., the Founding Fathers used the term democracy to address the political ills 
and dangers they sought to avoid, and calling someone a ‘democrat’ was almost an insult at the outset of the 
nineteenth century (Rosanvallon 2009, 541). In Montesquieu and Tocqueville’s well-known accounts, 
democracies are marked by instability and a tendency to become corrupt – flaws that accompany the virtues of 
democracy, in their accounts. Kant’s taxonomy of political regimes has a place for despotic democracy. It is all 
the more curious that at the French National Constituent Assembly of 1789 supporters of the monarchy (the group 
of the Monarchiens) also called themselves ‘Democratic Royalists‘. 
 
iii In its original usage, as conceived by Antoine Destutt, Comte de Tracy, in late 18th century, ideology stood for 
a ‘science of ideas’ (See his ‘Eléments d'idéologie’, 1801). The society of ‘ideologists’ at Institut de France which 
he formed was united by the understanding that our ideas are the necessary consequence of the society in which 
we live; the group therefore committed to an inquiry of the social production of ideas. 
iv I refer to the form of reflective social science initiated by Max Horkheimer in the 1930s and developed at the 
Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) in Frankfurt, Germany, through a collaboration among 
himself, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Friedrich Pollock, Otto 
Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, Leo Lowenthal, and others. The Institute originated as a Marxist study group and 
developed into a heterodox school of thought, uniting the diverse research trajectories of its members by an  
interest in the relationship between history and reason, with a commitment to emancipatory social change.  
v ‘[T]he emancipation of the productive class is that of all human beings without distinction of sex or race’, writes 
Marx in the preamble to the 1880 ‘Programme of the Parti Ouvrier’ (Marx 1880, 376).  The often quoted dictum 
‘Labor in white skin cannot emancipate itself where the black skin is branded’ is from an 1866 letter Marx writes 
to François Lafargue; the line is repeated in ‘Capital’ (Marx 1972 [1866], 275; Marx 1967 [1867], 301).  The 
concern with gendered inequities is present also in Marx’s early writings: in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 he argued that women’s position in society could be used as a measure of the development 
of society as a whole. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1944) explore anti-Semitism as the social 
construction of racial prejudices through which the bourgeoisie enacts its repressed frustrations, which are in turn 
engendered by the contradictions of capitalism; Erich Fromm (1957) views the authoritarian personality as trapped 
in a masochistic surrender to a higher power articulated as an exclusive collective identity (e.g. nation or race).  
vi For a detailed discussion of the conceptual mechanisms of Ideologiekritik see Azmanova 2012. 
vii My critique of the democratic turn in critical social theory dovetails with that offered by Valierie Waldow in 
her contribution to this volume, where she demonstrates that even a minimalist conception of democracy (as 
developed within critical approaches to democratic peace theory) can be generalised and essentialised, thereby 
reproducing the ideological effects a theory sets out to critique.   
viii Allen here draws on the work of Michel Foucault to extend the intuitions of the Frankfurt School into a 
negativistic conception of emancipation; for the purposes of the current analysis, I remain on the territory of the 
pioneers of Critical Theory.   
ix For a clarification of the distinction I draw between, on the one hand, the systemic dynamics (or operational 








dynamics are enacted (e.g. the institution of the private property of the means of production) see Azmanova 2016 
and 2018.  
x Critical Theory inherits Marx’s understanding of the ‘objectivity’ of the social world (the material life-process 
of society) in contra-distinction to solipsistic, subjective perceptions. That objectivity is enacted in inter-subjective 
practices through which humans create their world as they make sense of it. The central unit of analysis is practice: 
the ‘practical, human-sensuous activity’ (Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, I ). Moreover, society is understood 
holistically, as a system of social relations – the sum of interrelations into which people enter in the course of ‘the 
social production of their existence’ (Marx, ‘Grundrisse’ 1857; ‘Preface to the critique of political economy’, 
1859). The notion of intersubjective practice does not allow for a rigid subject-object divide (see Azmanova 
2019a.) For the best substantiated refutation of the move to attribute to Marx an ontology of objectivity see Henry 
1983.  
xi See Jay (1984) for a detailed discussion of Adorno’s ontology of the social as a fractured yet structured totality.  
xii The commodification process is also enacted through extra-market mechanisms which Marx termed broadly 
‘primitive accumulation’, which is not just an embryonic stage in capitalist development; it is an ongoing 
structuring process which mainly takes the forms of physical domination, violence and destruction. 
 
xiii Marx refused to identify himself as a Marxist to the extent that this term came to signify a method of 
socioeconomic analysis based on abstract laws (Engels, ‘Letter to Edward Bernstein’, 1882, . 
xiv I use the term ‘democratic capitalism’ to grasp the unity of democracy as a political system and capitalism as a 
system of social relations that has been typical of the institutionalised social order of the majority of Western 
societies since forms of representative democracy began to be combined with the competitive production of profit 
(capitalism’s constitute dynamic) sometime in the 18th century. 
xv For an alternative understanding of the essential contestability and openness of the concept of democracy see 
Valerie Waldow’s contribution to this volume.  
xvi Horkheimer, Adorno, Kirchheimer, and later Marcuse viewed advanced capitalism as politically manipulated 
and authoritarian capitalism in which the corporatist accumulations of private interests obstruct the formation of 
genuine democracy, while Pollock and Neumann saw it also as democratic capitalism and an achievement of 
progressive forces. 
xvii It is therefore ironic that Horkheimer had previously opposed the appointment of Habermas as Adorno’s 
assistant in Frankfurt on grounds of Habermas’ being too strongly influenced by Marx.  Habermas had shaped his 
early intellectual biography as a Marxist, and was one of the very few openly Marxist academics in the anti-
communist West Germany of the 1950s.  
xviii I owe this phrase to Azar Dakwar, and I am grateful to him for an enlightening discussion of the way this 
process plays out in Habermas. My initial view was that Habermas comes to suspend both the systematic critique 
of the political economy of democratic capitalism and the critique of ideology. The functioning of Ideologiekritik 
as ideology construction merits a more careful exploration than the one I am offering here. On this see, for instance, 
the exchange between J.G Finlayson and D. Cook (Cook 2000; Finlayson 2003; Cook 2003). 
 
xix Nietzsche spoke of the ‘democratic prejudice’ of the moderns, observing that when we perceive the past through 
the egalitarian and progressive historiographical self-congratulatory conceits of the present we fail to understand 
other schemes of values and we miss the chance to understand and reflect on ourselves through them (Nietzsche, 
1967 [1887], 28). Here I follow Wendy Brown’s interpretation of Nietsche’s term (Brown 2001, 98f.). 
